

Session VIII

The Problem of the Western Philosophical Notion of Substance : A Solution by Unification Thought

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Introduction

The English word *substance* is a transliteration of the Latin *substantia*, which literally means "that which stands under" or that which remains under the various appearances of a thing as its permanent element.

Traditionally, this word is a translation of the Greek *ousia*, which is the feminine participle of the verb *einai* ("to be"). Parmenides used *einai* to express the unchanging reality of the world. Plato used *ousia* to describe the world of Ideas as stable and unchanging. Aristotle expanded the meaning of *ousia* and applied it to particular things in the changing world, even though he was careful enough not to abandon the unchanging character of *ousia* which had been

proposed by Parmenides and Plato. According to Aristotle, particular things in the world, which he calls "primary substances," have their universal qualities which inhere in them, and while the qualities of each primary substance alter through a lapse of time, the individuality and self-identity of the substance is retained.

It is well known that this Aristotelian notion of substance has a problem. The problem is that particular substances are essentially independent from each other, having no genuine relations to each other. Aristotle himself admits this, when he holds in his *Categories* that particular substances are "neither predicable of...nor present in" each other.² Descartes' definition of substance well portrays the problem: "Really the notion of *substance* is just this—that which can exist by itself, without the aid of any other sub-stance."³

Aristotle's notion of substance has been extremely influential in the history of Western philosophy. It was used by Thomas Aquinas as a pillar of his own philosophy; and it found its culmination in Descartes' dualism. Thus the problem of disconnectedness of substances has been widespread in the West. After Descartes, rationalists such as Leibniz and Spinoza attempted to solve the problem but with little success. Empiricists such as Locke and Hume were simply skeptical about the notion of substance. Since the 19th century, creative thinkers such as Hegel, Bergson, and Whitehead have made new suggestions to solve the problem, having recourse to dialectics, *elan vital*, process, etc. (Hegel's suggestion will be evaluated in the first section of the third chapter.) These new suggestions are valuable from the Unification Thought perspective, but they still seem to be far from satisfactory because of their somewhat excessive emphasis upon not-being (Hegel) and becoming (Bergson and Whitehead).

Without its problem satisfactorily solved yet, Aristotle's notion of substance still dominates much of Western thought not only in philosophical circles but in one's everyday life. The philosophical problem of the disconnectedness of substances is reflected in our society, which lacks in harmony and is full of conflicts and struggles. The problem of individualism still haunts our society. It seems therefore that unless we have a new philosophy which can

successfully address the problem of the Aristotelian, Western notion of substance, we will not be able to build an ideal world of harmony.

In this situation, Unification Thought claims to be a new philosophy with such a task. Emerging from the East, Unification Thought is a philosophical development made based upon the religious teachings of Rev. Sun Myung Moon, founder of the Unification Church. Unification Thought states that its task is "to help build a world of true peace, harmony, and happiness for all mankind."⁴ The purpose of the present paper is to show that Unification Thought, to be such a philosophy, can successfully solve the problem of the disconnectedness of substances in the West, affirming the genuine relations of particular substances which it calls "individual truth bodies."⁵

For this purpose, the present paper is going to have three chapters. Chapter I will analyze the problem of the Western notion of substance which started from Aristotle. It will be seen that the problem of the disconnectedness of substances can be attributed to the problem of their universal qualities being mere abstractions in Aristotle's substance-quality ontology, because universal qualities as mere abstractions in that ontology have no concrete power to genuinely correlate particular substances. More importantly, it will be seen also that the problem of universal qualities being mere abstractions in turn can be attributed to Aristotle's static view of God only as pure form which resulted from his inconsistent application of hylomorphism.

Chapter II will show a solution by Unification Thought. Unlike Aristotle's static God who is only pure form, the God of Unification Thought is dynamic in that he has within himself the dynamic reciprocity of the dual characteristics of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang*, which are roughly equivalent to form and matter, respectively.⁶ This kind of God keeps the universal qualities of particular substances from being mere abstractions, thus making them active enough to be able to genuinely correlate particular substances. This solution by Unification Thought naturally results from its chapters on "Theory of the Original Image," "Ontology," and "Epistemology." To be more specific, it results from the doctrine of God as *Sung Sang* and

Hyung Sang in "Theory of the Original Image," from the law of resemblance between God and creation in "Ontology," and from the theory of collation in "Epistemology." These three are combined to constitute what I call an "ontological theory of collation," which is the Unification Thought solution here.

Before the emergence of Unification Thought, however, there were already some notable schools of thought which had valuable solutions of the problem. From among them, Hegelianism and Mahayana Buddhism will be chosen to be evaluated from the Unification Thought perspective in Chapter III of the present paper. Hegelianism and Mahayana Buddhism are from West and East, respectively, and yet they have some striking similarities in their treatments of the problem. While Hegel suggests a dialectical movement between Being and Not-being within the Absolute Spirit, Mahayana Buddhism in a similar vein proposes a dynamic reciprocity between Fullness and Emptiness within Sunyata itself. The two suggestions naturally disagree with the Aris - totelian doctrine of God only as pure form and somewhat resemble the Unification doctrine of God's dynamic dual characteristics of Sung Sang and Hyung Sang. This shows how universal the problem in question is, and also how universal man's concern and way to solve it are, But Hegelianism and Mahayana Buddhism are not without some difficulties, as will be seen in Chapter III.

In the Conclusion, therefore, it will be stated that Unification Thought offers a best solution to the problem we are dealing with.

CHAPTER I

The Problem of the Western Notion of Substance

1. Substance-Quality Ontology

By substance Aristotle primarily means a particular individual thing in the world. Thus he writes in *Categories*: "Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse."⁷ Substances in this primary sense are called "primary substances" and distinguished from

"secondary substances" which are species and genera. For example, the individual man as a primary substance is different from the species "man" and the genus "animal" which are secondary substances, for while the species and the genus, to which the individual man belongs, are predicable of him who is a primary substance, he is not predicable of any primary substance.⁸

In *Metaphysics* as well, Aristotle explains the primary sense of the word substance. Right after generally applying the word substance to four main objects: (1) the essence, (2) the universal, (3) the genus, and (4) the substratum (subject), he says concerning the last term that "the substratum is that of which the [three] others are predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else," and that "that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance."⁹ Thus primary substances do not refer to the essence nor to the universal nor to the genus but to particular subjects.

From above it is clear that according to Aristotle, primary substances are particular individual things in the world. When we talk about substances, they normally mean primary substances unless otherwise indicated.

Sharply distinguished from substances are universal qualities which inhere in them. Whereas substances are particular and individual, qualities are universal and common. Whereas particular substances only function as subjects and not as predicates, universal qualities usually function as predicates. Whereas particular substances are not present in each other, universal qualities are usually present in particular substances. "Everything except primary substances [i.e., every universal quality] is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance."¹⁰ Aristotle lists ten such universal qualities or categories: "substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection."¹¹ The first item listed here is substance, but it does not mean primary substance but secondary substance. The third item is quality, but it does not mean what the present paper has generally called quality so far but quality in the narrower sense of the word, i.e., attributes such as white and round.

The above sharp distinction between particular substances and

universal qualities leads to the following two important points in the substance-quality ontology of Aristotle :

First, a particular substance always maintains its self-identity, even though its universal qualities may alter through a lapse of time. "The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities."¹² A tree remains one and the same tree, even though it may be at one time green and at another yellow. Therefore a particular substance has no change except the change or alteration of its universal qualities. Hence a particular substance itself is changeless and static in nature.

Second, particular substances are capable of existence apart from each other, while universal qualities are incapable of existence apart from particular substances. Universal qualities inhere in substances by being either predicable of or present in them, so that universal qualities cannot exist apart from substances. For example, the quality of whiteness would not be able to exist apart from a white particular thing. Thus qualities are like parasites in substances. By contrast, substances can exist apart from each other, because they are neither predicable of nor present in each other. This point is clear, because according to Aristotle, "present in a subject" means "incapable of existence apart from the said subject."¹³ Thus substances are not genuinely related to each other. This constitutes the very problem of the Aristotelian, Western notion of substance, which is the topic of the present paper.

The above two points, interrelated to each other, are problematic indeed. These problematic points arise because in the substance-quality ontology of Aristotle universal qualities, as sharply distinguished from particular substances, are mere abstractions from particular substances, having no concrete power in and by themselves to make particular substances each dynamic and mutually related to each other. Unfortunately, this problem of universal qualities being mere abstractions is not really recognized among those who are in the classical Western tradition based upon Aristotelianism, when they mistakenly argue that particular substances are related to each other through the mediation of their common universal qualities inhering

in them.¹⁴ The argument is mistaken because it does not realize that universal qualities have no mediating power.

In my opinion, the problem of universal qualities being mere abstractions arises because of Aristotle's static view of God as pure form devoid of any kind of potency. This point will be dealt with in the third section of the present chapter. Before that, however, we will see in the following section hylomorphism, whose inconsistent application on the part of Aristotle resulted in his static view of God.

2. Hylomorphism

Hylomorphism is Aristotle's doctrine of the unity of form (*morphe*) and matter (*hyle*), according to which any particular substance is a composite of form and matter. Form and matter are inseparable correlatives in the constitution of each particular substance, not being found in divorce from each other. Form represents what a particular substance is made into (i.e., the formal cause), while matter denotes what it is made of (i.e., the material cause). Form and matter also represent act (*energeia*) and potency (*dynamis*), respectively. Act gives activity and definiteness to potency, which in turn, as the capacity to be actualized, passively receives activity and definiteness. Hence the relationship of form and matter in a particular substance is meant to be a dynamic one.

This hylomorphism is a commendable doctrine, because it affirms the inseparable and dynamic unity of form and matter within each particular substance. As long as form is inseparable from matter and gives activity to matter, it would be able to make particular substances each dynamic and mutually connected to each other. In this situation, form would be far from the level of abstraction, so that universal qualities which are accidental forms would be far from being mere abstractions.

But something wrong happened in the mind of Aristotle, because when he was explaining physical change in the world by means of hylomorphism, he virtually abandoned the activity of form originally affirmed in hylomorphism, thus making form something inactive, abstract, and detached from matter. For Aristotle, therefore, physical

change in the world simply consists in the alteration of various inactive forms within a substance and not in the dynamic unity of act and potency itself within a substance. Thus all physical change merely consists in matter acquiring an inactive form which it did not have before; and during the change, various inactive forms appear newly, while matter is continuously present.

In line with this, Aristotle talks about three kinds of change: (1) "generation," (2) "destruction," and (3) "movement."¹⁵ The first two are referred to as substantial change, but they do not mean substantial change within one and the same substance. On the contrary, they only mean change from one substance to another; for "generation" is the origin of a new substance from a previous one because of the appearance of a new form, and "destruction" the passing away of a substance which is changed into a new one because of the appearance of a new form.

What about the third kind of change? This is the "movement" (or "motion") of one and the same substance. According to Aristotle, the movement of one and the same substance occurs in terms of the change of its inactive accidental forms which are universal qualities or categories. He selects three main categories: quality, quantity, and place, and says that there are three kinds of movement—of quality, of quantity, and of place. Motions in respect of quality, quantity, and place are called "alteration," "increase or decrease," and "locomotion," respectively.¹⁶ In each of these, there are a pair of contraries. For example, when a green leaf turns yellow, this is a motion in respect of quality, having green and yellow as a pair of contraries. When the size of a balloon becomes big, this is a motion in respect of quantity, having small and big as a pair of contraries. When someone goes downstairs, this is a motion in respect of place with up and down as a pair of contraries. In each of these, a particular substance itself does not change and only its universal qualities change.

Thus, whether change is "generation," "destruction," or "movement," Aristotle explains all this in terms of the alteration of various inactive forms and not in terms of the dynamic unity of act and potency itself within a substance. Contrary to the original assertion of his hylomorphism, forms are inactive as mere abstractions.

Therefore he cannot appreciate the real dynamic nature of substance itself nor the genuine relations of substances.

What, then, led Aristotle to abandon the active character of form originally affirmed in his hylomorphism? It is his static view of God as pure form devoid of any kind of potency. This point will be explained in detail in the following section. In the remainder of the present section, however, it should be noted that his static view of God results from his inconsistent application of hylomorphism, which is that whereas he applies it to the world, he does not apply it to God, i.e., that whereas he regards every particular substance in the world as a composite of form and matter, he does not see God that way. To Aristotle, God is pure form having no matter at all.

3. God as Pure Form

According to Aristotle, God is pure form or pure act completely devoid of materiality or potency. As pure form God is completely actualized, so that he wants nothing at all. Having no dynamic unity of form and matter within himself, God is "unmoved and exempt from all change."¹⁷

In my opinion, this kind of changeless God would not be able to help sustain the dynamic unity of form and matter in each particular substance in the world. Of course, one could argue that each substance in the world can have a dynamic unity of form and matter on its own without depending upon any outside source of power. But in the system of Aristotle, particular things in the world are imperfect, thus being in need of an outside source of power which is God. In fact, Aristotle believes that the world needs God, who has a creative power to move and attract it as its "formal cause," "final cause," and "efficient cause" in its actualizing process. Therefore our problem here is not that God is not a source of power for the world, but rather that he is not an effective source of power for the world. This is so because God as pure form devoid of any kind of matter cannot be an *effective* source of power for the dynamic unity of form and matter in each particular substance in the world. In other words, God, who is not hylomorphic, cannot be an effective

standard for the world, which is hylomorphic.

Another way to describe the problem is by saying that the God of Aristotle is not the "material cause" of the world, even though he is its formal cause, final cause, and efficient cause. If God is not the material cause as well, how can he be an effective source of power for the world which is material as well as formal?

If God is not an effective source of power for the world in the above sense, then each particular substance would not be dynamic, contrary to what Aristotle's hylomorphism originally attempted to appreciate. For without an effective input from God, the dynamic unity of form and matter in each particular substance would not be sustained. Form would cease to be act, degrading into the level of abstraction, and matter would cease to be potency, falling into the level of inertia. In this situation, there would be no change within a particular substance except the change of its inactive universal qualities or categories.

If this is the case, different particular substances cannot be genuinely related to each other. For even though it could be argued that they are related to each other through their common denominators which are their universal categories or forms, nevertheless these categories or forms are mere abstractions for the above-mentioned reason, thus having no concrete power to correlate the particular substances. The conclusion of Aristotle therefore is that particular substances are fundamentally independent from each other, i.e., capable of existence apart from each other.

This problem arises from Aristotle's inconsistent application of hylomorphism, which unjustly excludes God from the application. If Aristotle had regarded God as hylomorphic, he might have been able to avoid the problem of the disconnectedness of particular substances.

CHAPTER II

A Solution by Unification Thought

1. God as *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang*

In the preceding chapter, it was seen that the final reason for

the problem of the Western notion of substance lies in Aristotle's problematic doctrine of God as pure form. The ultimate solution of the problem of substance therefore should have a doctrine of God which asserts that God has not only form but matter of some kind. Unification Thought has this kind of doctrine of God.

According to Unification Thought, God has the dual characteristics of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang*. The *Sung Sang* of God is "the mind of God, or the attribute of God that constitutes the fundamental cause of the invisible, functional aspects of all existing beings (i.e., their mind, instinct, life, etc.),"¹⁸ while the *Hyung Sang* of God is "the attribute of God that constitutes the fundamental cause of the material aspect of all existing things (i.e., their mass, shape, structure, and so on)."¹⁹ The essence of the latter "may be considered a kind of energy latent in God. This latent energy is considered as manifested in the matter of the created world and in its physical force."²⁰ Thus the *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* of God are respectively mental and physical in nature, roughly equivalent to what Aristotle calls form and matter, respectively. What is important is that the two are not separate but united, constituting a "United Body" in God, as they have give-and-take action between each other. *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* within God can have give-and-take action, because they are essentially of the same quality, with only a relative, not an absolute, difference. In this sense, "Unification Thought is neither dualism, nor spiritualism, nor materialism: it is Unitism."²¹

Unification Thought asserts that this unity between *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* within God is the ultimate reason for the genuine relations of particular existents in the world, because the world, created in the image of God, resembles the unity of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* within God: "Order within the created world is a reflection of the order within the Original Image."²² This assertion of Unification Thought is further described in terms of its doctrine of the "two-stage structure of existence" within God.²³ So, let us see that doctrine in the remainder of the present section.

The *Sung Sang* of God consists of Inner *Sung Sang* and Inner *Hyung Sang*. Inner *Sung Sang* is the subjective part of God's mind with its three functions of intellect, emotion, and will, while Inner

Hyung Sang is the objective part of God's mind, referring to ideas, concepts, original law, and mathematical principles. Within the *Sung Sang* of God, therefore, there is give-and-take action between Inner *Sung Sang* and Inner *Hyung Sang*, before the *Sung Sang* of God has give-and-take action with the *Hyung Sang* of God. There are thus two types of give-and-take action taking place consecutively: (1) inner give-and-take action between Inner *Sung Sang* and Inner *Hyung Sang* to form an "Inner Quadruple Base" within the *Sung Sang* of God; and (2) outer give-and-take action between *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* to form an "Outer Quadruple Base" within God.²⁴ This constitutes the two-stage structure of existence within God, and it provides the ultimate reason for order in the world, as will be seen below.

2. Give-and-Take Ontology

Particular things in the world are called "individual truth bodies" rather than substances in Unification Thought. All individual truth bodies were created in the image of God, so that they reflect the two-stage structure of existence in God. (This is the law of resemblance in Unification Thought.) First of all, each individual truth body reflects the Inner Quadruple Base within God, having give-and-take action between subject and object elements within itself. Next, different individual truth bodies reflect the Outer Quadruple Base within God, having subject-object relations among themselves through give-and-take action. "Accordingly, every individual truth body has subject and object elements within itself, and is, at the same time, connected with other individual truth bodies in subject-object relationships." Thus the two-stage structure of existence in God leads individual truth bodies in the world to stand as individual truth bodies first and to be genuinely related to each other next. When they are thus related or connected to each other, they are called "connected bodies."²⁵

Thus the ontology of Unification Thought explains give-and-take action between individual truth bodies in the world based upon give-and-take action within the harmonious structure of God's dual characteristics. Whence it can be called give-and-take ontology. This

ontology is indeed a good solution to the Western problem of the disconnectedness of substances, because that problem arose finally from Aristotle's problematic doctrine of God as pure form. Hence God with his dual characteristics of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* is the key to solving the problem: "We come to the conclusion that we must understand God [and his dual characteristics], in order to solve today's increasingly complicated problems at their roots."²⁷

But we need something more than this actually, because besides God's dual characteristics of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang*, individual truth bodies' dual characteristics of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* are actually involved in the making of the relations of individual truth bodies. This matter will be treated in the following section.

3. An Ontological Theory of Collation

Although the Western problem of the disconnectedness of substances arises finally from Aristotle's doctrine of God as pure form, nevertheless it arises more directly from the Aristotelian problem of forms being mere abstractions without any concrete power to genuinely relate individual substances. Consequently, although the Unification Thought solution offers an alternative doctrine of God, saying that God's dual characteristics of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* is the ultimate solution of the problem, nevertheless it should also directly address the problem of forms being mere abstractions and find a way to argue that forms can always be active enough to genuinely relate individual things to each other. This will necessarily involve the dual characteristics of individual truth bodies in addition to the dual characteristics of God, because forms are located in the *Sung Sang* of individual truth bodies.

In fact, the epistemology chapter of *Explaining Unification Thought* has a "theory of collation" which epistemologically addresses the Aristotelian problem of forms being mere abstractions in order to secure the active role of forms (and contents) in genuinely uniting a subject and his object of cognition.²⁸ It seems however that we need a more general theory of collation, i.e., an ontological theory of collation. The present section therefore will suggest an ontological theory of collation, following the epistemological theory of collation

as well as the doctrine of God as *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* and the law of resemblance between God and the world.

For that purpose, let us first see the epistemological theory of collation in Unification Thought. According to that theory, when God's "cosmic consciousness" permeates the subject of cognition, forms and contents of the subject himself are activated to be "prototypes" ("images of forms" and "images of contents") in the subconsciousness of the subject. Forms and contents of the object, on the other hand, are transmitted to the cerebral cortex of the subject where they become activated images. The subject, then, can effectively "collate" his activated prototypes with the activated images of his object. Hence the genuine cognitive relation between the subject and the object is possible because of the active role of forms and contents under the influence of God's cosmic consciousness.

Let us now proceed to suggest an ontological theory of collation based upon the above theory. The dynamic unity of God's *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* centered upon his Heart is perhaps what the above theory calls God's cosmic consciousness. When it permeates the world, it helps sustain the dynamic unity of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* in each individual truth body. This explains the real dynamic nature of each individual truth body. As long as individual truth bodies are each dynamic in this sense, their *Sung Sang* is activated and their *Hyung Sang* far from being inertial. Therefore their forms and contents, located in their *Sung Sang*, are not mere dead abstractions but active enough to be collated. Hence the genuine ontological relations of individual truth bodies.

It is interesting to observe that Unification Thought has formulated about ten fundamental "forms of existence" or "categories": (1) self-existence and force, (2) *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang*, (3) positivity and negativity, (4) subjectivity and objectivity, (5) position and settlement, (6) relation and affinity, (7) action and multiplication, (8) time and space, (9) original law and mathematical principle, and (10) infinity and finiteness.²⁹ They are all derived from "give-and-take action" and its related elements in God's image. Besides this first group of categories, Unification Thought has a second group of categories derived from the first. To name some

of them, they are (1) quality and quantity, (2) content and form, (3) essence and phenomenon, and so forth.³⁰ All these categories, whether in the first or the second group, are equivalent to Aristotle's categories seen above in the first chapter. But Unification Thought's categories are different from Aristotle's categories in that the former are activated by God's dynamic dual characteristics of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang*, whereas the latter suffer from the problem of abstraction due to Aristotle's problematic doctrine of God.

CHAPTER III

Solutions by Hegel and Mahayana Buddhism : an Evaluation from the Unification Thought Perspective

1. Hegel : The Absolute Spirit as Being and Not-being

Long before the emergence of Unification Thought, Hegel suggested a valuable solution to the problem of the disconnectedness of substances.

Hegel has a dynamic view of reality based upon his dialectical logic. In his *Science of Logic*, Hegel talks about the basic triad of "being," "not-being," and "becoming."³¹ "Being" is the most general concept that the mind can formulate from various individual things. As pure being, it has no specific content, so that it is wholly indeterminate. It therefore passes into the concept of "not-being," which is the antithesis of being. That is to say, if we try to think being without any determination at all, we find that we are thinking nothing. We are also led back to being from not-being. In this sense, being and not-being are the same, even though it may be difficult for our common sense to understand it. "Becoming" is the unity or synthesis of "being" and "not-being."

For Hegel, God is the Absolute Spirit with this basic triad. So the concept of the Absolute Spirit as being passes into the concept of the Absolute Spirit as not-being, and their synthesis is the concept of the Absolute Spirit as becoming, as a process of self-development. The self-development of the Absolute Spirit is the world, in which the Absolute Spirit is disclosed.

Hegel also holds that each particular thing in the world has the

triad of being, not-being, and becoming, so that when particular things go through the first two stages of being and not-being and reach the third stage of becoming, they develop themselves within each other, i.e., disclose themselves within each other. This dialectical process from one particular thing to another continues until it ends in the Absolute Spirit.

From above it is clear that Hegel uses his dialectical method to argue for the genuine relation between God and the world and also the genuine relations of particular things in the world.

From the Unification Thought perspective, it can be said that being and not-being in Hegel's dialectical method are roughly equivalent to *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* in Unification Thought. Hegel sees God as having the dynamic unity of being and not-being in much the same way as Unification Thought which regards God as having the dynamic unity of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang*. Therefore both Hegel's method and Unification Thought can effectively address the problem of the Western notion of substance caused by Aristotle's doctrine of God as pure form.

But Hegel's method is different from Unification Thought in an important way which gives rise to difficulties in Hegel's method. Hegel's method is different from Unification Thought in that the former starts from the concept of being which has no correlative in the beginning, whereas Unification Thought sees *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* as correlatives from the beginning. Therefore Hegel almost forcibly had to give an antithesis to the thesis of being. The antithesis is notbeing. This has led Hegel's philosophy to have a negative tone, necessarily giving rise to a philosophy of struggle, which has been utilized by Marxism. The almost forcible method of dialectics in Hegel has also led his idealist philosophy to be purely mechanical: "the [Hegelian] dialectical process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis became purposeless and purely mechanical."³² Therefore Hegel's system had strong negative reactions from people such as Feuerbach and Kierkegaard.

2. Mahayana Buddhism: *Sunyata* as Fullness and Emptiness

The development of Mahayana Buddhism owes much to Nagarjuna

of the second century. In this school of Buddhism, the doctrine of *Sunyata* ("Emptiness") plays a central role. *Sunyata* is not just a concept but something which should be experienced with existential profundity, so that it is quite difficult to describe it. But let us describe it by starting from the world of phenomena.

This world, according to Buddhism, has nothing which is unchanging, eternal, and substantial. Thus the substantial nature of *atman* ("self") is denied, and *anatman* ("no-self") is advocated instead. To put it another way, everything in this world has within itself the self-contradictory and dynamic unity of "being" and "non-being" (*u* and *mu*, respectively, in Japanese). Masao Abe explains the self-contrary, dynamic unity of *u* and *mu* within everything in the world as follows:

They [*u* and *mu*] are entirely relative, complementary, and reciprocal, one being impossible without the other. In other words, *mu* is not one-sidedly derived through negation of *u*. *Mu* is the negation of *u* and *vice versa*. One has no logical or ontological priority to the other. Being the complete counterpart to *u*, *mu* is more than privation of *u*, a stronger form of negativity than 'non-being' as understood in the West. Further, *u* and *mu* are completely antagonistic principles and therefore inseparable from one another, and thus constitute an antinomy, a self-contradiction.³³

Let us now proceed to *Sunyata* as understood in Mahayana Buddhism. *Sunyata* as emptiness is realized when the abovementioned self-contradictory oneness of *u* and *mu* in the world is overcome, transcended, and negated. Thus it is neither *u* nor *mu* but absolute *Mu* as distinguished from relative *mu*. What is important, however, is that as absolute *Mu*, *Sunyata* is not just an objectified Emptiness standing outside of the world. Rather, it "empties" itself to become non-Emptiness, i.e., Fullness or wondrous Being, and thereby dynamically stays immanent in the world. Thus *Sunyata* has within itself the dynamic unity of Emptiness and Fullness antinomous to each other.

According to Mahayana Buddhism, *Sunyata* as understood this way constitutes the basis of the genuine unity of all things in the world. For its dynamic unity of Fullness and Emptiness, while being beyond *u* and *mu* in the world, stays there to make possible the dynamic unity of *u* and *mu* within each particular thing, thus enabling various things to be genuinely related to each other. Hence comes the Buddhist doctrine of *pratityasamutpada*, which can be translated as "dependent origination," "relationality," "relational origination," or "dependent co-arising."⁸⁴

It can be said that Mahayana Buddhism's doctrine of *Sunyata* as the dynamic unity of Fullness and Emptiness is roughly equivalent to the Unification Thought doctrine of God's dual characteristics of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang*. Therefore Mahayana Buddhism can effectively address the problem of the Western notion of substance. But it seems that Mahayana Buddhism has at least two points of difficulty. First of all, in spite of its experiential profundity, it counts somewhat excessively on negative terms such as *anatman*, *mu*, and *Sunyata*. The same kind of criticism has been directed to Hegel's method. Secondly, more importantly, *Sunyata*, in spite of its dynamic structure which means to explain the unity of all things, seems to be simply something created from below rather than something already there with a definite plan to unite, for Mahayana Buddhism starts from the phenomenal world of *u* and *mu* and then reaches *Sunyata* as its negation and further as the negation of that negation based upon experience. Therefore this Buddhist approach from below cannot probably be an ultimate solution to explain the world.

CONCLUSION

In Chapter I, we saw the problem of the Western notion of substance, which is that different substances are not genuinely related to each other because forms, which are originally meant to be active, become mere abstractions given the Aristotelian doctrine of God as pure form devoid of any kind of potency.

Chapter II saw that Unification Thought can effectively address the problem through its ontological theory of collation backed up

by its doctrine of God's dual characteristics of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang*.

Chapter III dealt with Hegelianism and Mahayana Buddhism, seeing that both can quite well address the problem because of their suggestions similar to the Unification Thought doctrine of God's dual characteristics. But we were able to point out some difficulties involved in them.

As a conclusion, we can say that while the Unification Thought solution is not totally alien given Hegelianism and Mahayana Buddhism, it is better than their suggestions. It is probably a best solution in the world. Whether the Unification Thought solution works or not, however, will have to be decided by whether or not it can also actually solve social ills such as wars, conflicts, and misunderstandings which are the reflections of the philosophical problem of the disconnectedness of substances.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Aristotle : Selections*, ed. W. D. Ross (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955) 3.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, 2 vols., tr, Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ros (Combridge : Cambridge University, 1911-12 and 1931) 2 : 101.
4. *Explaining Unification Thought* (New York : Unification Thought Institute, 1981) xvii.
5. *Ibid.* 45-75.
6. *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* are Korean terms and can be roughly translated as "internal character" and "external form," respectively.
7. *Aristotle : Selection* 3.
8. *Ibid.* 3-4.
9. *Ibid.* 65-66.
10. *Ibid.* 4.
11. *Ibid.* 3.
12. *Ibid.* 7.

13. *Ibid.* 2.
14. For this kind of argument, see, for example, Constantine Cavarinos, *The Classical Theory of Relations: A Study in the Metaphysics of Plato, Aristotle and Thomism* (Belmont, Mass.: Institute for Byzantine and Modern Greek studies, 1975).
15. *Aristotle: selections* 86-87.
16. *Ibid.* 88.
17. *Ibid.* 101.
18. *Explaining Unification Thought* 6-7.
19. *Ibid.* 10.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.* 15.
22. *Ibid.* 83.
23. *Ibid.* 36.
24. The "Quadruple Base," whether inner or outer, is a structural description of the four elements involved in give-and-take action: Heart, *Sung Sang*, *Hyung sang*, and United Body. For this, see *Explaining Unification Thought* 28-41. The present paper is silent about the "Developing" Quadruple Base, which involves the Multiplied Body instead of the United Body. The reason for the silence is that we are primarily concerned with the genuine relations of "identity maintaining" existents.
25. *Explaining Unification Thought* 57.
26. *Ibid.* 76.
27. *Ibid.* xxiv.
28. *ibid.* 143-57.
29. *Ibid.* 149-50.
30. *Ibid.* 187.
31. *Hegel's Science of Logic*, tr. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969) 82-108.
32. *Explaining Unification Thought* 162.
33. *Zen and Western thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985) 127-28.
34. *Ibid.* 125.

Session VIII : Comment

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A valuable service is rendered to our conference by Dr. Theodore Shimmyo's discussion of the notion of substance. The problem of substance is indeed crucial in the interlectual history of the West and for the wider philosophical ecumenism that has become excitingly possible in our time. In America process thought has made much of this problem in challenging the ontology of traditional Western theology, and in the conceptuality of modern science no issue looms larger than that of the individual thing (substance or being) in its causal relations with the whole of reality, including the principles of mathematics, valuation and teleology. In the west thinking about all of these matters was largely shaped by Aristotle, and thus Dr. Shimmyo does well to orientate his reflections in terms of a critique of Aristotle, namely of the alleged (a) non-relationality and (b) staticity of Aristotelian substances. A solution to Aristotle's problems, and thus an ontological gateway toward grounding a new culture of unitive relationality, Dr. Shimmyo sees in Unification Theoght, offering interesting comparisons as well with Hegel and Mahayana Buddhism. The solution envisaged, and most fully realized in Unification Thought, is one in which mutual relations as well as dynamism that integrates matter become constitutive of all substances,